



CHARTING VAGUENESS SHOALS THROUGH THE NARROWING OF 
CORRUPTION STATUTES 
Khari L. Cyrus* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine living in a society where the laws on the books are only as 
explicit as “Behave well in public spaces, or be subject to a fine.”  When in 
public spaces you would likely curtail all behavior that you might possibly 
think could be considered unruly.  In this same society you might also 
imagine, or even expect, that those enforcing the laws will have expansive 
discretion to determine who will be subject to prosecution for violating the 
condition of “behaving well.”1  Now imagine serving in public office, and 
being prohibited from “Acting against the interests of constituents.”  At first 
you might think this is fairly straightforward, and you should conform your 
conduct to that of a “good” public official.  But very quickly you would find 
yourself in a situation where you must act in a way that enrages or 
disappoints a segment of your constituency.  Did you just violate the law?  
What constitutes “acting,” what defines constituent “interests,” and who 
even are these constituents?  This law prohibiting conduct is so vague that 
just about any action might be a violation of the law. 
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 1 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47–51 (1999) (detailing an ordinance 
prohibiting gang members from loitering in public together or with others); Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 359–61 (1983) (describing an ordinance lacking sufficient detail and giving police 
broad discretion to determine “credible and reliable” identification); Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (declaring vagrancy statute void); Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (detailing an ordinance stating “[i]f three or more people 
meet together on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any 
police officer or other person who should happen to pass by.”). 
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In the United States, these sorts of broad criminal statutes are often 
found unconstitutional.2  These broad and under-defined statutes fail under 
a well-developed vagueness doctrine.  In the United States, criminal 
statutes must have an ascertainable standard of guilt, or they will fall to the 
vagueness doctrine.3  This is the premise of the “void-for-vagueness 
doctrine,” which is grounded in the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.4  However, if the statute can be saved by a 
narrow construction, the court will read the statute narrowly and allow the 
law to stand in its curtailed form.5 
In the context of government and politics, vague corruption statutes 
coupled with broad prosecutorial discretion pose a unique issue.6  Federal 
 
 2 See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 (holding that the ordinance prohibiting gang member loitering 
was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide minimal guidelines to govern 
enforcement); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359–61 (finding that an ordinance requiring loiterers to 
present “credible and reliable” identification was unconstitutionally vague because it gave officers 
too much discretion); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (holding a vagrancy ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague because it was too general and encouraged “arbitrary and erratic” 
enforcement); Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (finding an ordinance mandating that groups of three or 
more people meeting on a sidewalk must not annoy police or passersby unconstitutionally vague 
because it creates an “unascertainable standard”).  But see M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws 
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 769–71 (1994) (questioning the 
viability of stalking laws given the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting 
Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 245 (2017) (arguing that teen 
sex statutes are overly-broad and under-defined, but are permissible despite vagueness doctrine 
considerations); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2010) (describing the vague nature of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its permissibility 
despite vagueness doctrine). 
 3 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551, 2557–58 (2015) (finding the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) unconstitutionally 
vague because it has no ascertainable standard of guilt); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 
544–45 (1971) (per curiam) (finding that a city’s “suspicious persons ordinance” was 
unconstitutional because it lacked an ascertainable standard of guilt); see also John F. Decker, 
Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 
241, 253 (2002) (outlining the centrality of ascertainability to vagueness doctrine). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
 5 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 662 (2012) (finding that the Court must 
construe the minimum-coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act as a tax and not a 
mandate-with-penalty if they wished to save it from constitutional infirmity); Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 
U.S. 500, 515 (1964)) (“‘[A]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save 
it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose of a statute . . .’ or judicially rewriting it.”).  See generally Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional 
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 (2009).  While courts can 
read statutes narrowly, they only do so if the narrow construction is readily apparent.  See Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing 
construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent.”). 
 6 Broad statutes criminalizing actions associated with government and politics may be vulnerable to 
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corruption statutes have been consistently challenged for vagueness, and 
the Court has frequently narrowed the apparent scope of corruption 
statutes in order to address vagueness issues and avoid complete 
invalidation of the statute.  While the courts work to save vague statutes 
from themselves if they are able, they do not go so far as to read something 
into the statute that is clearly not there.7  Where do courts draw the line 
between vague and sufficiently specific?  
In Skilling v. United States, Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority 
stated, “[c]onstruing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core 
meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal.”8  Through this 
action, the Court found the statute at hand to be permissible on a narrow 
interpretation, because to read it any broader would bring it up against a 
shoal that would make the law impermissibly vague. 
The Court has established no definitive line separating vague statutes 
from those that are sufficiently specific.  Rather than draw an explicit line, 
it appears that the Court has navigated around shoals it wishes to not brush 
against.  In this Comment, I will follow the narrowing of federal corruption 
statutes in an effort to chart these “vagueness shoals”9 that courts use to 
box-in otherwise vague laws.  In Part I10 I will explore the history of the 
vagueness doctrine and how it has evolved into what it is today.  This 
conversation follows with what the courts consider “vague” and what their 
options are upon deciding that a statute is too vague.  There is also an 
account of why it matters to know how the courts handle vague criminal 
statutes, particularly when the subject matter deals with public corruption.   
Following a discussion on the vagueness doctrine, Part II will navigate 
relevant statutes that shed light on the Court’s process of finding vagueness 
shoals.11  The statutes being considered are the honest-services statute,12 the 
 
abuse for political gain.  See, e.g., Abby Ohlheiser, How Dinesh D'Souza’s Indictment Became ‘Proof’ of 
Obama’s Conservative Inquisition, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2014/01/how-dinesh-dsouzas-indictment-became-proof-obamas-conservative-
inquisition/357351/ (discussing the allegations that President Obama targeted Republican and 
Conservative critics through federal indictments). 
 7 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 841 (“[The Supreme] Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to 
save it against constitutional attack, [but] it must not and will not carry this to the point of 
perverting the purpose of a statute . . . .”). 
 8 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010). 
 9  Throughout this Comment, I use “vagueness shoals,” “shoals of vagueness,” and “shoals” in 
reference to practices, rights, and areas that the Supreme Court will not allow vague statutes to 
exist within or govern. 
 10 See infra Part I. 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
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bribery statute,13 the extortion statute,14 and the gratuities statute.15  Each 
of these sections will explore the background information surrounding the 
history and use of these statutes and will show how this connects to the 
process of charting vagueness shoals.  
Part III is an assessment of the current state of statute narrowing in the 
corruption context and explains the benefits of definitively marking the 
shoals of vagueness.16  This Part also discusses recent cases dealing with 
public corruption – notably the corruption case against United States 
Senator Bob Menendez and the overturning of corruption convictions of 
former United States House Representative William J. Jefferson.  This Part 
also discusses vagueness concerns regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and considers how a potential “void-for-vagueness” challenge might be 
resolved in light of the identified vagueness shoals. 
I.  THE VAGUENESS DOCTRINE 
To establish the framework for the exploration of the narrowing of 
corruption statutes, a discussion on the history and the subsequent 
expansion of vagueness will be discussed below.  The discussion will then 
turn to theoretical efforts to separate uncertain and vague from precise and 
permissible. 
A.  History of Vagueness  
The vagueness doctrine stems directly from the Due Process Clauses in 
the Constitution.17  If a law does not give an average citizen sufficient 
 
 13 Id. at § 201(b).  This provision of the United States Code contains multiple sections on bribery. 
The discussion in this Comment focuses on the narrowing of the term “official act” as it appears 
throughout the bribery statutes. 
 14 Id. at § 1951. 
 15 Id. at § 201(c)(1)(A).  The discussion of gratuities throughout this Comment is centered on the 
Court’s definition of the quid pro quo requirement. 
 16 See infra Part III. 
 17 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“As misuse of the 
criminal machinery is one of the most potent and familiar instruments of arbitrary government, 
proper regard for the rational requirement of definiteness in criminal statutes is basic to civil 
liberties. As such it is included in the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.”); see also PAUL 
H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 65 (2d ed.  2012) (“The vagueness 
prohibition is rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.”).  The legality principle acts in a formal way to dictate the process of criminalizing 
actions.  Id. at 64 (stating that doctrines within the legality principle define “who may create 
criminal offenses . . . how they must do so . . . and when the government may punish violations” as 
opposed to “what” may be criminalized).  The vagueness doctrine makes up one of the pillars of 
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information to know what conduct is prohibited or what penalty will follow, 
then their ability to conform their actions to the law is inhibited.18   
The vagueness doctrine in the United States is used to void laws that a 
court deems to be too uncertain or impermissibly vague.  Turning back to 
the example given in the Introduction about “behaving well in public 
spaces,” if someone were arrested under this law, their defense would likely 
rest on the vague language of the statute and the inability to conform their 
behavior to an ill-defined standard.  A law as vague as the one described 
would likely be found unconstitutionally vague. 
A study of the history of the doctrine shows that it was initially used in 
conjunction with First Amendment law as “a way to invalidate laws that 
might chill protected speech.”19  However, the doctrine expanded beyond 
its initial use as a supplement to protect free speech.  Vagrancy laws were 
laws passed by cities that criminalized common street behavior and granted 
wide discretion to police to enforce those laws.20  In the tumultuous times of 
the Cold War and the Civil Rights Movement, these vagrancy laws led to 
the widespread arrest and prosecution of persons the police found 
undesirable in the community.21  The expansion of the vagueness doctrine 
to laws other than those associated with chilling protected speech was 
instrumental in overturning vagrancy laws.22  Vagueness arguments were 
 
the legality principle, a principle that defines criminal law in the United States.  Id. 
 18 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citing Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972)) (“[V]oid for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two 
connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is 
required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so 
that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.”). 
 19 RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
90 (2d ed. 2011); see Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent 
vagueness test should apply.”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (citing Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509–10, 517–18 (1948)) (“[T]his Court has intimated that stricter 
standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially 
inhibiting effect on speech . . . .”); see, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–
72 (1997) (identifying particular concern over the Communications Decency Act of 1996 because 
its vagueness poses a chilling effect on free speech). 
 20 See Risa Goluboff, The Forgotten Law that Gave Police Nearly Unlimited Power, TIME (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://time.com/4199924/vagrancy-law-history/ (describing the history of vagrancy laws and 
their use by law enforcement). 
 21 Id. (describing the vagrancy laws underlying the 1949 arrest of Isidore Edelman, a “middle-aged, 
Russian-born, communist-inclined soapbox orator” in Los Angeles, CA, and the arrest of 
Margaret Papachristou, a “blond, statuesque, twenty-three [year old] . . . Jacksonville native” who 
was out with two black men in Jacksonville, FL 20 years later). 
 22 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1991) (voiding an ordinance for lack of 
clarity on what actions were being criminalized and for legislature’s failure to provide guidelines 
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also used in other contexts to challenge laws targeting individuals who were 
deemed to be undesirable members of their communities.23 
B.  What Constitutes Vague? 
The process of deciphering vague from permissible is one that is 
shrouded in mystery and blurred lines.  In his dissenting opinion in Winters 
v. New York, Justice Frankfurter described the vagueness doctrine as itself, 
vague.24  The lack of a defining principle for vagueness likely stems from 
the fact that it comes from flexible language.25  The common explanation 
given for the vagueness doctrine is that criminal statutes cannot be “so 
vague that individuals of common intelligence must guess at its meaning.”26  
This may lay the groundwork, but it is hardly sufficient by itself in 
guiding courts to determine whether laws are vague.  To complicate 
matters more, this is not the only principle guiding vagueness.  Writing for 
the majority in Nash v. United States, Justice Holmes stated, “[T]he law is full 
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as 
the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”27  This muddies 
the water and further complicates vagueness, but also serves as a realistic 
 
for law enforcement); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (voiding a 
vagrancy statute due to its vagueness and utility as a discriminatory prosecutorial tool); Coates v. 
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (voiding a law that prohibits three or more people 
from gathering on the sidewalk and engaging in behavior that a passerby might find annoying); 
Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Strikes Down Vagrancy Law, WASH. POST (May 3, 1983), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/03/supreme-court-strikes-down-
vagrancy-law/a3fc2b52-f0f2-4f42-82a0-0b64836fe685/?utm_term=.a622b46a8105 (discussing 
the Court’s voiding of a San Diego, California vagrancy ordinance). 
 23 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Tennessee, 414 U.S. 1163, 1168–69 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (arguing that a criminal statute used to arrest a protester of the Vietnam war 
was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give fair notice of the criminalized conduct); 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348–51 (1964) (holding that a South Carolina criminal 
trespass statute being challenged by a black patron who was arrested for sitting in a segregated 
lunch counter was vague and violated the Due Process Clause); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 495–98 (1951) (describing a law criminalizing the spread of communist ideologies and the 
subsequent legal challenge). 
 24 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating “‘[Vagueness]’ is not a quantitative 
concept.  It is not even a technical concept of definite components.  It is itself an indefinite 
concept.”); see also Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for 
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 259, 261 (2010) (arguing that the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court lacks a definitive standard). 
 25 It is important to note, however, that the flexible language of the vagueness doctrine allows it to 
adapt to various factual situations. 
 26 Gold Diggers, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 469 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing Connally v. 
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
 27 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). 
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view of the complexity of the doctrine.28  It raises questions as to when a 
law that requires an average citizen to estimate what behavior is 
criminalized becomes insufficient due to lack of guiding principles.  
Vagueness is also not considered in a vacuum, but is considered in a 
context where it is presumed that the statutes passed by Congress are 
valid.29 
While vagueness guidelines are rather murky, the Supreme Court has 
spoken with clarity about vagueness in certain contexts.  The West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals in State v. Flinn recognized the lack of detailed 
guidelines governing vagueness, but found that the United States Supreme 
Court had been clear in defining vagueness in terms of “First Amendment 
and similarly sensitive constitutional rights.”30  
While laws dealing with certain rights are interpreted from the face of the 
statute, others require a deeper look to determine their certainty or 
uncertainty.31  In addition to being facially vague, statutes can also be vague 
as applied.32  A facially vague statute is one that is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications.33  Alternatively, laws can be challenged on the basis that they 
are vague as-applied, meaning they are unconstitutional given their 
application to a specific circumstance.34  This dichotomy in how laws can be 
 
 28 For example, fraud statutes have to be sufficiently general to encompass a wide variety of schemes 
that are fraudulent in nature, but which are not described with specificity in the statute.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (referring to "any scheme or artifice to defraud" as opposed to describing 
specific actions). 
 29 See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (“The strong presumptive 
validity that attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are 
not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether 
certain marginal offenses fall within their language.”). 
 30 State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538, 543 (W. Va. 1974) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 
(1940)) (“Statutes governing potential First Amendment and similarly sensitive constitutional 
rights will be strictly tested for certainty by interpreting their meaning from the face of the 
statutes.”); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1976) (“Where a statute’s literal 
scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] 
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”). 
 31 See Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 32–33 (upholding a statute as sufficiently certain by looking 
beyond the face of the statute and evaluating its application to the defendant’s situation). 
 32 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 
(1994) (“Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconstitutional in one of 
two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or (2) the court may find the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of circumstances.”). 
 33 See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citing United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (“[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge 
by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,’ i.e., that 
the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.”). 
 34 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2580 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“‘It is well 
established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
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ruled as vague is helpful in that it places vagueness considerations in one of 
two buckets, but it does not necessarily help in defining what vagueness looks 
like.  The Court has undergone efforts to identify when vagueness challenges 
must be considered facially or as-applied, and has based that determination 
on whether the challenged law involves a First Amendment right.35 
There are some important additional considerations that help mark 
what may or may not be vague.  One such addition is due process only 
requires that the law give “sufficient warning” so that people avoid that 
which is prohibited.36  Furthermore, it takes a lawyer’s conclusion after 
extensive research to deem a law as vague, not the research or the 
understanding of the common citizen.37  Given the potential need for a 
trained lawyer to decipher whether a law is vague or not, this doctrine has 
been described as disconnected from the lives of ordinary citizens.38  This 
removal of notice requirements from ordinary life has led to the argument 
that vagueness doctrine inquiries should be in terms of “limiting arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement by police officers and prosecutors” as 
opposed to addressing fair notice.39  In fact, the Court has identified that 
the prevailing factor in vagueness considerations is the ability for 
discriminatory application as opposed to concerns over fair notice.40  By 
 
must be examined’ on an as-applied basis.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)). 
 35 See id.  
 36 Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (per curiam); see also Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 
1075 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the residual definition of “crime of violence” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide 
sufficient warning of prohibited conduct); United States v. Sun & Sand Imports, Ltd., Inc., 725 
F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the relevant standard under vagueness was whether the 
Flammable Fabrics Act gave sufficient warning and that definitions promulgated under the Act 
met the standard); United States v. Speltz, 733 F. Supp. 1311, 1312 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding that 
a statute’s failure to define “plant” in its regulation of the growth of marijuana plants did not 
render it unconstitutionally vague because it still provided fair warning). 
 37 See Rose, 423 U.S. at 50 (“Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, 
treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may 
compel or forbid.”). 
 38 See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1, 5 (1997) ([T]here is something ‘inescapably fictive’ about the [vagueness inquiry 
regarding notice]; it focuses on a sort of ‘lawyer’s notice’ that seems far removed from ordinary 
life.” (citing John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 189, 211 (1985))). 
 39 Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355–57 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
574 (1974); Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995); StreetWatch 
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 40 See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (stating “perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine 
is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 
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focusing their concerns with vague laws to the issue of arbitrary 
enforcement, the Court has taken a step towards narrowing vagueness 
doctrine and providing guidance on what in fact constitutes a vague statute. 
C.  Options with Vague Statutes 
Courts can save a vague statute from itself rather than void it on 
constitutional grounds, and not only do they have the power to do so,41 
they have the duty to do so if possible.42  When faced with these statutes, 
courts decide between throwing the entire statute out or construing the 
statute narrowly, thus allowing it to stand, albeit in a tailored fashion.43  
This process of narrowing is not an open delegation of legislative power,44 
 
530 U.S. 703, 732–33 (2000) (finding a statute sufficiently specific by evaluating whether the 
statute provided law enforcement adequate guidance inhibiting discriminatory application).  In its 
earlier opinions associated with unconstitutionally vague laws, the fair notice requirement was a 
constant thread throughout all of the Court’s considerations.  However, this shifted when the 
Court began using vagueness doctrine to overturn vagrancy laws.  See Lockwood, supra note 24 at 
272 (detailing the Court’s decision to switch focus from public notice concerns to arbitrary 
enforcement concerns). 
 41 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 
(1932)) (“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, 
of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a 
limiting construction.”); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368–70 (1971) 
(‘“[I]t is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”’ (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). 
 42 See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24 (“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute 
challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, 
if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction.” (emphasis added)); Thirty-seven Photographs, 
402 U.S. at 369 (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and . . . a 
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) 
(noting accord with Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26–27 (1968) (finding that the Court should 
read a challenged statute narrowly to avoid constitutional questions))).   
 43 See United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973) 
(“[The Court’s] task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the 
will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.”); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 777 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that facially vague statutes can be saved by a 
“narrow[ ] judicial construction.”). 
 44  But see Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485–86 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (casting doubt on the authority of courts to excise or sever unconstitutional portions 
of statutes in order to allow the constitutional portions to stand); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 423–24 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large 
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could 
be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the 
judicial for the legislative department of the government . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875))). 
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but rather an opportunity for the judiciary to fashion the law that was 
passed into a state where it does not violate any constitutional provisions.45  
To develop this narrowed interpretation, courts turn to the various canons 
of interpretation,46 where legislative history carries particular importance.47 
Some scholarship suggests that the Court throws out statutes under the 
vagueness doctrine in order to create a “buffer zone of added protection at 
the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.”48  This scholarship 
looks beyond how courts narrow statutes, and asks when courts make the 
determination that a narrowing must occur.  The central argument, which 
will be explored in Parts below, is that the Court throws out statutes that 
venture too close to the freedoms identified in the Bill of Rights.  But 
beyond those freedoms, there are other areas that the Court also wants to 
protect—identified below as vagueness shoals.49 
D.  Why it Matters to Know the Shoals of Vagueness 
Before exploring the narrowing of corruption statutes in order to find 
the vagueness shoals the Court considers, it is important to note the 
relevance of the vagueness doctrine in the context of public corruption 
statutes.  Corruption is a pervasive issue and is a concern shared by a large 
segment of the United States’ citizens.50  It is a concern that has been 
around since the formation of the American political system and has 
shaped the framework of our democracy.51 Given the proximity of 
corruption to politics, vague statutes that grant wide discretion to police 
and prosecutors are a legitimate cause for concern, because these vague 
 
 45 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems . . . .”). 
 46 See generally Larry M. Eig, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Statutory interpretation: General 
Principles and Recent Trends (2014). 
 47 See id. at 45–46; see also Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1954) (finding that the use of legislative history has greatly expanded in the 
federal courts). 
 48 Student Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). 
 49 See infra Part III. A. 
 50 See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, 
GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-
corruption.aspx (describing the high levels of corruption that American citizens perceive in their 
government). 
 51  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987) 
(stating that at the Constitutional Convention, “[n]othing was more to be desired than that every 
practicable obstacle should be opposed to . . . corruption.”). 
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statutes could provide the basis for political prosecution and even greater 
levels of corruption.52  While vagueness doctrine is developing in other 
contexts,53 this comment focuses solely on vagueness in the corruption 
context because of its highly political nature. 
The Supreme Court has more closely scrutinized laws that might 
infringe upon First Amendment rights and other sensitive freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution.54  Corruption statutes have the potential to 
impinge on sensitive rights and freedoms and prevent the expression of 
political dissent or unpopular social views.55 
Imagine a Democratic wave in an upcoming presidential election, in 
which the Democratic Party regains control of both houses of Congress and 
the presidency.  If this new Democratic government proceeded to write and 
pass vague corruption laws and enforce them discriminately against their 
Republican colleagues, they could seriously undermine democracy and 
cripple the chances of any future challengers.  The ability for one political 
party to use discriminatory prosecutorial discretion made available by 
vague statutes is a troubling thought. 
While a scenario as extreme as the one described above is unlikely to 
occur,56 it is worth noting that Congress does indeed pass what some might 
call “vague” laws quite often.  While this vagueness might not reach the 
judicial standard of vagueness, the bills that leave Congress can, at times, be 
light on the details.  There are numerous reasons why this is the case, and 
it’s a mixed bag of good and bad justifications.  One reason Congress passes 
vague laws lacking detail comes from a practical governance point of view.  
By proposing legislation that is not too technical or down in the weeds, 
congressmen have a better chance of gaining their colleagues’ support and 
 
 52  See TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 11 (“[B]roadly interpreted corrupt intent laws are troubling 
[because] . . . they can be used to punish political enemies.”). 
 53 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210–11 (2018) (considering the vagueness doctrine as it 
applies to the Immigration and Nationality Act and the clause defining “crime of violence.”). 
 54 See supra note 30; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (stating that "significant 
encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compel[ ] disclosure imposes cannot be 
justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest" but instead must withstand 
“exacting scrutiny.”). 
 55 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text;  see also TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 7 (arguing 
that Supreme Court framework has placed civic interest in blocking corruption in opposition to 
First Amendment speech rights). 
 56 But see Ohlheiser, supra note 6; Allison R. Hayward, Column, The IRS Can Still Silence Political 
Dissent, USA TODAY (June 9, 2015, 6:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/ 
06/09/tax-regulation-irs-political-organizations-column/28477359/ (last updated June 11, 2015, 
10:49 AM) (describing the IRS under a Democratic administration utilizing vague wording to 
target and delay Tea Party applications for tax exempt status). 
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seeing the bill become law.  Rather than propose a bill with dozens of 
stumbling blocks that might trip up potential supporters, an easier path 
forward is to write a bill with a high-level of generality that avoids the sticky 
issues that might prevent others from supporting it.  And in following this 
process, members can pass a vague bill that receives broad support across 
parties and then portray the legislation as a victory for their side and their 
set of views. 
There are other justifications for Congress’ propensity to draft and 
enact vague legislation.  Another consideration is the appetite for Congress 
to police its own behavior, or the lack thereof.  Regarding public 
corruption, the criminal statutes that are passed will undoubtedly apply to 
Congress and regulate the way they campaign and govern.  Tasking 
Congress with criminalizing some of the behaviors that Members 
themselves engage in regularly is potentially too tall an order.57  Again, 
rather than get down into the details, some might deem it best to stay high-
level and not risk explicitly criminalizing some of the very same practices 
they themselves partake in. 
Not all justifications have negative intentions.  Corruption threatens 
democracy,58 and Congress has attempted to root it out from the American 
political system through various laws, including those discussed in this 
Comment.  One of the strongest justifications for passing a vague law in 
this context is that Congress is essentially engaged in a balancing act.  It 
does not want to write criminal statutes that are so specific that they 
criminalize the behaviors of a small segment of the population in, perhaps, 
a discriminatory way.  But it also does not want to pass laws so vague that 
there is truly no guiding principle in how to apply it or enforce it.  This 
leaves Congress writing legislation that fits somewhere in the middle.  
Recognizing that people are adaptive and will try to find ways to operate 
outside the scope of the law, passing a broader statute can ensure that all 
 
 57 See, e.g., Natalie Andrews, Anti-Sexual Harassment Legislation Governing Lawmakers Stalled in Congress, 
WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-sexual-harassment-
legislation-governing-lawmakers-stalled-in-congress-1531857273?ns=prod/accounts-wsj 
(discussing the issues Congress is facing in reconciling two bills meant to root out sexual 
harassment in Congress); Bradley A. Smith, Why Campaign Finance Reform Never Works, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 19, 1997, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB858722905424003000 (“[W]hen it 
comes to political regulation and criticism of government, legislators have strong vested interests 
that lead them to mistake what is good for them with what is good for the country.”). 
 58 See, e.g., International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-309, 
§ 202, 114 Stat. 1090 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151–52 (2000)) (“Widespread 
corruption endangers the stability and security of societies, undermines democracy, and 
jeopardizes the social, political, and economic development of a society.”). 
Oct. 2018] CHARTING VAGUENESS SHOALS 279 
   
 
the behaviors Congress wishes to criminalize will fall under the spectrum.   
Related to the concerns about Congress passing vague statutes is the 
concern that the unelected federal judiciary will fill in the missing details and 
essentially create laws.59  By leaving statutes open and vague, the legislature 
is granting the courts the power to fill in the gaps and substitute their beliefs 
for those of the elected representatives charged with creating laws.60 
II.  THE NARROWING OF CORRUPTION STATUTES 
The sections below will provide discussion on the background and 
creation of federal corruption statutes and how the courts have narrowed 
their scope throughout time.  The statutes discussed are the honest services 
statute,61 the federal bribery statute,62 the extortion statute,63 and the 
gratuities statute.64 
A.  Honest Services 
This section discusses honest services, its history, and how the courts 
have narrowed the statute.  Before discussing the narrowing of honest 
services, the sections below will chart the creation of honest services and its 
official codification in the law.  The discussion will then analyze the case 
law throughout the statutes history to discover what shoals the courts have 
identified, explicitly or implicitly, to help narrow the law. 
1.  History of Honest Services 
Honest services fraud has a history intimately tied to that of the mail 
and wire fraud statutes.65  The mail and wire fraud statutes, codified as 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, respectively, have long been effective tools for 
 
 59 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2008) (arguing that the current scholarship surrounding the 
nondelegation doctrine largely ignores the judiciary, the third branch of government); see also 
Sasha Volokh, Opinion, How Ambiguous a Statute may Congress Pass?, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/31/how-ambiguous-
a-statute-may-congress-pass/?utm_term=.4587486890d4 (detailing the conflict over 
congressional delegations to the judiciary). 
 60 Lemos, supra note 59, at 436–38. 
 61 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 62 Id. § 201(b). 
 63 Id. § 1951. 
 64 Id. § 201(c)(1)(A). 
 65 Id. §§ 1341, 1343. 
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prosecutors seeking to target fraud and corruption.66  A relevant element in 
both mail and wire fraud is a “scheme or artifice to defraud,”67 which is a 
broad term that enabled courts to read in other duties and apply the 
statutes to schemes to defraud people out of honest services.68  This 
expansion of the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes to include honest 
services eventually reached the Supreme Court.   
In the Supreme Court case McNally v. United States, the government 
brought charges against a Kentucky official who, in selecting the state 
insurance agent, devised a plan where he would receive kickbacks through 
money paid to companies he partially owned.69  The case was brought on 
the argument that he effectively defrauded Kentuckians by depriving the 
citizens of their intangible right that the government’s business be 
conducted in an honest manner.70  The Court, however, did not agree with 
the assessment that the statute protected the intangible right of honest 
services.71  Instead, the Court found that the mail fraud statute was 
intended to protect people from “schemes to deprive them of their money 
or property.”72  With this finding, the Court eliminated the concept of the 
intangible right to honest services and stated that if Congress wanted the 
statute to go further than just money or property, then it needed to “speak 
more clearly than it has.”73 
Congress acted on this statement and passed what is now the honest 
services statute the following year.74  The statute sought to clarify what 
might have not been clear before, that a scheme to defraud could also 
 
 66 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980) 
(describing the mail and wire fraud statutes as effective tools of prosecutors to attack fraud); 
Christopher M. Matthews, Prosecutors Broadly Use Mail-Fraud, Wire-Fraud Statutes, WALL ST. J. (June 
9, 2015, 1:26PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-broadly-use-mail-fraud-wire-fraud-
statutes-1433870788 (discussing the use of the mail and wire fraud statutes as a strong tool for 
prosecutors). 
 67 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice 
to defraud . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1343 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 13–14 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the mail and wire 
fraud statutes applied to private sector honest services and this duty could not be defrauded 
pursuant to the statutes); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding 
that a scheme to defraud individuals out of public honest services fell within the scope of the mail 
and wire fraud statutes prohibition on schemes to defraud). 
 69 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 356. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 360. 
 74 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010). 
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include a scheme to defraud an individual of their intangible right to honest 
services.75  Thus, in 1988, Congress created the modern honest services 
statute in direct reaction to the Court’s McNally decision. 
2.  The Narrowing of Honest Services 
From the Skilling decision in 2010 to the McDonnell v. United States 
decision in 2016, the Court has continued to narrow the honest services 
statute by identifying vagueness shoals that the law cannot run against.  
The first opportunity the Court had to rule on honest services following the 
enactment of the government statute in 1988 was in Skilling.76  
In Skilling, the charge of honest services fraud was against Jeffrey 
Skilling, who rose through the ranks of Enron Company to eventually 
become its CEO.77  Soon after becoming CEO, Skilling left the company, 
and a few months later the company spiraled into financial ruin and 
declared bankruptcy.78  A subsequent investigation of what occurred 
internally at Enron revealed that company officials were misrepresenting 
the health of the company and propping up its value, to the eventual 
detriment of the shareholders.79  It was discovered that Skilling himself was 
involved in these schemes, and he was later charged with honest services 
fraud.80  The Supreme Court in a 9-0 decision on the judgment found that 
Skilling could not be charged on honest services fraud, because the honest 
services statute only applied to schemes related to briberies and kickbacks.81 
This limitation of the statute strictly to schemes to defraud others of 
honest services through bribery or kickbacks was a serious curtailing of the 
statute.  The Court looked to the body of case law prior to the passing of 
the statute to determine its core application and found that the core 
consisted of bribery and kickback schemes.82  
In parsing down honest services, the Court prevented the doctrine from 
existing in its expansive manner, and may have revealed a vagueness shoal 
in the process.  By allowing the increased expansion of honest services, the 
 
 75 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 76 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 77 Id. at 368–69. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 368. 
 82 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407 (2010) (“The ‘vast majority’ of the honest-services 
cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback 
schemes.” (quoting United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1987))). 
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Court would grant prosecutors a catch-all tool to bring charges against a 
wide variety of actors for any number of actions.83  By setting outer limits, 
the Court made clear their reluctance to allow prosecutors to run wild with 
the statute and rely on it for all of their prosecutions.  In addition to gutting 
the use of the statute as a catch-all measure, it is not difficult to imagine that 
the Court saw the potential for an expansive honest services statute with ill-
defined outer boundaries to run up against other areas, or shoals, the Court 
wishes to protect. 
Following the decision in Skilling, it was affirmed in United States v. 
Blagojevich that honest services only applies to bribery and kickback 
schemes.84  In this case, former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was 
convicted under a number of corruption statutes for his actions following 
the election of then-President-elect Barack Obama.85  Notably, Blagojevich 
wanted to engage in political trading with the President-elect by agreeing to 
appoint Obama’s close colleague Valerie Jarrett to his old Senate seat in 
exchange for Obama either giving him a cabinet position, persuading a 
foundation to hire him with a substantial salary, or finding someone to 
donate $10 million to an organization that Blagojevich would run.86 
By denying certiorari,87 the Supreme Court allowed the Seventh Circuit 
judgment to stand.  In reaching the appellate court decision, Judge 
Easterbrook described the political trading Blagojevich attempted to engage 
in as nothing more than permissible political logrolling.88  The court 
reiterated the holding of Skilling, but also explicitly found that honest 
services could not possibly extend to something as essential to effective 
governance as logrolling.89  This opinion takes the Supreme Court’s Skilling 
decision and uses it to chart a potential vagueness shoal—the 
criminalization of actions taken by public officials in their efforts to govern.  
Allowing the criminalization of political trading by elected officials would 
give prosecutors the power to disrupt the political process.  The Skilling 
decision was an instance where the Court recognized the potential for 
prosecutors to use the statute as a catch-all for “bad” behavior and decided 
 
 83 Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The possibilities range from any action that is contrary to public 
policy or otherwise immoral, to only the disloyalty of a public official or employee to his principal, 
to only the secret use of a perpetrator’s position of trust in order to harm whomever he is 
beholden to.”). 
 84 794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 85 Id. at 733. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Blagojevich v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1491 (2016). 
 88 Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 736 . 
 89  Id. 
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to constrain how far the law could be applied. 
B.  Bribery and “Official Act” 
The review of the bribery statute below will hone in on “official act” 
and how the definition has gone from an expansive definition to one more 
tailored to fit within the Court’s vagueness shoals.  The discussion begins 
with United States v. Birdsall,90 and then traces the narrowing of “official act” 
by the Supreme Court and circuit courts.  The cases narrowing “official 
act” discussed below are United States v. Muntain,91 United States v. Sun-Diamond 
Growers of California (“Sun-Diamond”),92 and McDonnell v. United States.93 
1.  History of Bribery and “Official Act” 
Although the American government at its formation had goals of 
combatting corruption,94 they did not pass any bribery statute of general 
applicability to public officials.95  They passed a statute prohibiting bribes 
related to certain members of the judiciary, customs officers, and tax 
officers, but did not prohibit bribery of legislators.96  It was not until 1853 
that the first federal bribery act of general applicability became law.97  Even 
then, Congress included broad jurisdictional language.98   
In 1962, Congress passed another federal bribery law in an effort to 
“reformulate and rationalize” criminal statutes dealing with government 
integrity.99 In this law, Congress gave definition to an “official act,”100 and 
in subsequent caselaw the Court acknowledged Congress’ intent to create a 
federal bribery law with broadly applicability.101 
 
 90 233 U.S. 223 (1914). 
 91 610 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 92 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 93 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 94  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 51, at 393. 
 95  See TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 105. 
 96  Id. 
 97  See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 491 n.8 (1984) (citing to Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, 
§ 6, 10 Stat. 171). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  “The term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought 
before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or 
profit.”  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (1962). 
 101  See Dixson, 465 U.S. at 496 (referring to Congress’ “long standing commitment to a broadly-
drafted federal bribery statute [and] its expressed desire to continue that tradition . . . .”). 
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2.  An Expansive “Official Act” 
The case we will consider to set the stage is United States v. Birdsall.102  
Birdsall was convicted of illegally selling liquor to Native Americans.103  
Following his conviction, it was discovered that Birdsall bribed two special 
officers appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.104  These officers 
were responsible for advising the Commissioner on whether judicial 
clemency would advance the efforts of the Commission,105 and by paying 
these individuals off, Birdsall attempted to influence the message they 
would send to the Commissioner regarding clemency.106  While the trial 
court found that a bribery conviction was not warranted given that the law 
did not prohibit the acts,107 the Supreme Court found that Birdsall’s giving 
of money to his co-defendants in an effort to influence them in their official 
positions was illegal and constituted a bribe.108  In this case, the Court took 
an expansive view of “official act” by finding that an official act includes 
“[e]very action that is within the range of official duty . . . .”109  They also 
held that an official act need not be explicitly written down as a statute or a 
regulation, but could be something as informal as a settled or common 
practice.110  The Court would proceed to narrow this definition in 
subsequent cases. 
3.  The Narrowing of “Official Act” 
While the Supreme Court narrowed “official act” in Sun-Diamond111 and 
McDonnell, circuit courts engaged in their own narrowing process along the 
way.  One such example is seen in Muntain, a 1979 case before the D.C. 
Circuit.112  Charles Muntain was the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor 
Relations for the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).113  While serving as a public official, he was 
involved in a scheme to sell group car insurance to labor unions as a benefit 
 
 102 233 U.S. 223 (1914). 
 103 Id. at 229–30. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 228–30. 
 107 Id. at 227. 
 108 United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 235–36 (1914). 
 109 Id. at 230. 
 110 Id. at 231. 
 111  See infra notes 120–129 and accompanying text. 
 112  United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 113  Id. 
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in union contract negotiations.114  To support this scheme, Muntain would 
travel across the country, often times on official business, and promote the 
group insurance to labor officials.115  For his efforts, he would receive a 
portion of any commission that might be generated.116  Muntain was 
convicted of receiving things of value in exchange for an official act, and 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit.117 
On appeal, the court held that Muntain did not engage in any “official 
acts” in furtherance of his scheme.  The framed the “official act” inquiry by 
stating that “the determinative factor is whether Muntain’s actions involved a 
matter or issue that could properly, by law, be brought before him as 
Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD.”118  Finding that the 
promotion of group car insurance is not a matter that could be brought 
before him in his role, the court concluded that no official act took place.119  
Although the Supreme Court in Birdsall held that an “official act” includes 
every action that is within the range of public duty, the Circuit Court 
narrowed that broad view by engaging in an inquiry of what fell within the 
public duties of the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD.120  
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of “official act” in 1999 when it 
heard Sun-Diamond.121  Sun-Diamond Growers Association was a trade 
association that was charged with giving then-Secretary of Agriculture 
Mike Espy illegal gratuities.122  It was alleged that Sun-Diamond had an 
interest in not only persuading Secretary Espy to adopt a particular 
regulatory definition that would benefit the association’s members but also 
getting the Department of Agriculture to convince the Environmental 
Protection Agency to abandon a proposed rule that would be detrimental 
to the interests of the association.123  The District Court convicted Sun-
Diamond of giving illegal gratuities, the conviction was reversed by the 




 114  Id. at 966. 
 115  Id. at 966–67. 
 116  Id. at 966. 
 117  Id. at 967. 
 118  United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 119 Id. 
 120  Id. at 967 n.3 (mentioning four other circuit courts that have engaged in a similar narrowing effort). 
 121  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).  
 122  Id. at 400–01. 
 123  Id. at 401–02. 
 124  Id. at 403-04. 
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Although Sun-Diamond was before the Court primarily on gratuities 
grounds,125 the Court used the opportunity to further define “official act.”  
The Court considered the level of detail provided by Congress in defining 
“official act” in the statute and reasoned that this detailed description must 
require reference to a particular “official act” and not just any action taken by 
an office holder in the course of executing their duties.126  Taking this a step 
further, the Court acknowledged that some actions taken by office holders 
involve “’official acts’ in some sense” but are not “’official acts’ within the 
meaning of the statute.  While the Court in Birdsall found that an “official act” 
is “[e]very action that is within the range of official duty,”127 the Court in Sun-
Diamond held that not every “official act” is subject to the bribery statute.128 
The Court narrowed the scope of “official act” by finding that only 
certain types of actions were relevant in the context of the federal 
corruption statutes.  By limiting “official act” to specific actions, the Court 
reasoned that it would be possible to “eliminate the absurdities” that would 
arise if prosecutors were allowed to bring charges against an official for any 
act.129  To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would result in nothing but the 
government’s discretion preventing the prosecution of absurdities.130 
The vagueness shoal preventing prosecutors from using broad language 
in a statute as a catch-all seems to be at play in this unanimous decision.  
Prosecutorial discretion serving as the only check on the enforcement of 
vague criminal statutes does not seem to be something the Court is willing 
to rely on, particularly when prosecutors have a catch-all mechanism that 
enables them to go after just about any action.  The limitation of which acts 
by public officials are subject to the bribery statute may also be an 
indication that the Court is hesitant to allow the prosecution of certain 




 125  See infra Section II.C.2.     
 126  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405–06. 
 127  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 128  The Court specifically identifies (1) replica jerseys given by champion sports teams each year to 
the President during their visit to the White House, (2) a high school principal gifting a school 
baseball cap to the Secretary of Education because the Secretary visited the school, and (3) a 
group of farmers providing a free meal to the Secretary of Agriculture when the Secretary is 
giving a speech to the farmers regarding matters of United States Department of Agriculture 
policy.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406–07.  Although all of these actions are performed in an 
official capacity, they are not official acts subject to the statute.  Id. at 407. 
 129  Id. at 408. 
 130  Id. 
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The next case that charts the narrowing of “official act”—and one that 
provides great context for identifying vagueness shoals—is McDonnell.  This 
is a case involving bribery charges against former Virginia Governor 
Robert McDonnell for his acceptance of gifts from Virginia businessman 
Jonnie Williams, as well as McDonnell’s work establishing programs at 
Virginia’s public universities that would benefit Williams.131  When 
Governor McDonnell was charged with honest services fraud and 
extortion,132 the government alleged that he had committed five official 
acts, thus making him subject to the statutes.133  At trial, the Government 
requested that “official act” be defined in the jury instructions as follows: 
The term “official action” means any decision or action on any question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be 
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in 
such public official's official capacity.  “Official action” as I just defined it 
includes those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice 
as part of a public official's position, even if the action was not taken 
pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law.  In other words, 
official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, 
even if those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job description . . 
. .  In addition, “official action” can include actions taken in furtherance of 
longer-term goals, and an official action is no less official because it is one 
in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.134 
McDonnell requested that the court instruct the jury that routine activities 
and settled practices such as “arranging a meeting, attending an event, 
hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official 
acts,’ . . . because they are not decisions on matters pending before the 
 
 131 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361–65 (2016).  
 132 Id. at 2365. 
 133 The “official acts” were as follows:  
(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, who were 
subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc;  
(2) hosting, and . . . attending, events at the Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage 
Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star 
Scientific’s products to doctors for referral to their patients;  
(3) contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to 
encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine;  
(4) promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia 
government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star 
Scientific’s business to exclusive events at the Governor’s Mansion; and  
(5) recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor’s Office] meet with 
Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company’s products could lower 
healthcare costs.   
  Id. at 2365–66 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134  Proposed Jury Instructions of the U.S. at 54, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 
(E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-00012).  
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government.”135   
 The trial court decided not to give McDonnell’s instructions to the jury 
and he was convicted.136  McDonnell appealed his conviction to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the trial courts jury instructions 
regarding “official act,”137 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts 
decision.138  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.139 
 In considering the text of 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3),140 as well as precedent 
and constitutional concerns, the Court found that the government’s broad 
interpretation was incorrect and the Court adopted a “more bounded 
interpretation of ‘official act’” 141 
While the Court formally utilized canons of statutory interpretation to 
narrow down the definition of “official act,”142 there are also vagueness 
shoals that help explain how they got to its decision.143  The Supreme Court 
did not grant certiorari in the Blagojevich case and did not take the 
opportunity to consider the criminalization of efforts to govern as a 
vagueness shoal.144  But in ruling on McDonnell, the Court acknowledged the 
same concern that Judge Easterbrook pointed out in Blagojevich – that some 
actions taken by public officials are necessary in their efforts to govern.145   
And on a similar theme, the Court recognized the substantial concern 
that vagueness in this context could lead to citizens “shrink[ing] from 
participating in democratic discourse.”146  It could be that the vagueness 
shoal preventing the criminalization of efforts to govern might be related to 
another shoal, the chilling of the rights guaranteed under the First 
Amendment.  A vague law whose use could have a chilling effect on 
 
 135  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2016). 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 2367. 
 138  Id. 
 139  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 891 (Mem). 
 140  “The term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought 
before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or 
profit.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) 
 141 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2016). 
 142  Id. at 2368–69 (using the “familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the 
company it keeps’” to narrowly define the words “question” and “matter” in the statute). 
 143 Id. at 2368–69. 
 144  See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 145  Id.; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372 (“The basic compact underlying representative 
government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on 
their concerns . . . .”) (emphasis in the original). 
146  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
Oct. 2018] CHARTING VAGUENESS SHOALS 289 
   
 
participation in the democratic process may be seen as entering a vagueness 
shoal.  One criticism of the prosecution of Governor McDonnell was that 
he was being targeted because he was a high profile, popular Republican 
politician.147  This fits directly with reasons why the Court narrows statutes, 
so that the federal government cannot crackdown on those with dissenting 
opinions, or even create the perception of a crackdown.  A vague law that 
can be used to arbitrarily prosecute dissenters or chill participation in the 
democratic process crashes into the First Amendment, and the Court might 
see this as an opportunity to narrow the law to prevent this collision with a 
vagueness shoal.   
Another issue raised by the Court, one that could be an explicit shoal, is 
their concern about an expansive definition of “official act” and its impact 
on federalism.148  A vague law that can be read to apply federal standards 
to an area within state jurisdiction might be subject to narrowing by the 
courts to preserve the principles of federalism. 
Finally, “official act,” as defined by the government, would give 
prosecutors a powerful and unchecked power.  The expansive definition 
covering almost every action by any public official could be used as a catch-
all tool with only the government deciding when its use is appropriate.  And 
criminal statutes cannot be construed on the assumption that prosecutors 
will “use it responsibly.”149 
C.  Extortion and Gratuities 
The journey to discover vagueness shoals can also be seen in the Court’s 
consideration of cases related to both the gratuities statute150 and the 
extortion statute.151  The cases, McCormick v. United States152 and Evans v. 
 
 147  See, e.g., Ohlheiser, supra note 6 (questioning the motives behind the Obama administrations 
prosecution of his critics).  During the McDonnell trial, lawyers for Governor McDonnell raised 
questions about why this Republican Governor was being prosecuted on an untested legal theory 
for actions that were no different than his Democratic predecessor.  Defendant Robert F. 
McDonnell’s Motion #1 Motion for Discovery of Selected Recordings of Communications 
Between Prosecutors & Members of the Grand Jury, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp.3d 
783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12).  They also raised the issue that the investigation of the 
Governor, an investigation riddled with leaks, took place during a hotly contested election to 
replace McDonnell and effectively sidelined him from any involvement in the campaign of his 
potential Republican successor.  Id. 
 148 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (finding that “[it is the State’s] 
prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state officials and their 
constituents.”). 
 149  Id. at 2372–73 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)). 
 150 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
 151 Id. § 1951. 
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United States153 discuss the Court’s operation within extortion statutes and 
how statute narrowing may not be as necessary in this space as it is in 
others.  A revisiting of United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California154 
highlights other vagueness considerations before the Court.   
1.  Extortion  
Extortion has its roots in state common law and was defined by 
Blackstone as a failure of trust by “taking, by colour of his office, from any 
man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than his 
due, or before it is due.”155  Extortion under the Hobbs Act, codified as 18 
U.S.C. § 1951, can take the form of extortion under color of official right or 
extortion by force, violence, or fear.  Extortion under color of official right 
is the type most associated with prosecuting corrupt public officials. 
Robert McCormick was a state politician in West Virginia when he was 
indicted with five counts of violating the Hobbs Act.156  McCormick was an 
advocate for a West Virginia program that allowed foreign medical school 
graduates to practice in the state under temporary permits while preparing 
for the state licensing exam.157  Under this program, some medical students 
practiced for years under the temporary permit although the continuously 
failed the licensing exam.158  When conversations about ending the 
program began to circulate, McCormick introduced legislation to extend 
the program and met with a lobbyist to discuss introducing a bill the 
following session to permanently address the issue.159  During his reelection 
campaign, McCormick informed the lobbyist of the costs of the campaign 
and indicated that he had not heard from any of the foreign doctors.160  
Through the lobbyist, the doctors provided cash to McCormick on four 
separate occasions, and then paid him a fifth time after he was reelected 
and passed a law supporting the interests of the foreign doctors.161 
 
 
 152 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 153 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 154 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 155  TEACHOUT, supra note 50, at 115–16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142). 
 156  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 261 (1991). 
 157  Id. at 259. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 260. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. 
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Regarding extortion, the district court judge instructed the jury as 
follows: 
In order to find Mr. McCormick guilty of extortion, you must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a given 
count of the indictment was made by or on behalf of the doctors with the 
expectation that such payment would influence Mr. McCormick's official 
conduct, and with knowledge on the part of Mr. McCormick that they 
were paid to him with that expectation by virtue of the office he held.162 
The jury convicted McCormick of violating the Hobbs Act and the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s jury instructions.163  
On appeal the Fourth Circuit also held that there is no explicit quid pro 
quo (this-for-that) requirement under the Hobbs Act and the government 
need not prove that money given to a public official outside of campaigning 
was given in exchange for an official act.164  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed.165  
The Supreme Court found that, in the context of campaign contributions, 
there is an explicit quid pro quo requirement to show that a public official 
extorted someone.166  Writing for the majority, Justice White stated: 
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold 
that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the 
benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some 
of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are 
solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment 
of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain 
property from another, with his consent, “under color of official right.”167 
To find contrary would enable prosecution of actions that had long been 
seen as legal and that are inevitable given our system of private campaign 
contributions.168   
The following year, the Court revisited extortion under the color of 
official right when it heard Evans.  In this case, a Georgia man served as an 
elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, 
Georgia.169  In an investigation into alleged public corruption in the Atlanta 
area, an FBI agent posed as a real estate developer and spoke on the phone 
 
 162  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 265 (1991). 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 265–66. 
 165  Id. at 266–67. 
 166  Id. at 273–74. 
 167  Id. at 272. 
 168  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991). 
 169  Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992). 
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with the public official on a number of occasions.170  The agent asked the 
public official for help in rezoning a particular tract of land, and paid the 
official $7000 in cash and wrote him a $1000 check for his campaign.  The 
official reported the check, but not the cash.171  The official was charged 
with extortion and was convicted at trial.172 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
courts ruling, and added that:  
[P]assive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the 
basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is being offered 
the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official 
power. The official need not take any specific action to induce the offering 
of the benefit.173 
The Supreme Court agreed with this statement of the law and affirmed.174  
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the common law origins of 
extortion and found that Congress had expanded the federal extortion law 
beyond its original use rather than narrow it.175  The Court further found 
that the public official need not start the relationship with the extorted 
party and that the word “induced” in the definition of the statute does not 
equate to “initiate.”176  Ultimately, in contrast to narrowing trends, the 
court held that “the Government need only show that a public official has 
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the 
payment was made in return for official acts.”177 
This is an instance where the Court has not gone down a narrowing 
path, because the statute does not appear to collide with any vagueness 
shoals.  The one area where a conflict might exist is in the context of First 
Amendment rights and campaign donations, but the Court in McCormick 
found that quid pro quo had to be shown, thus adding a layer of protection 
around the First Amendment freedoms. 
Although United States v. Enmons is not a case about extortion under the 
“color of official right,” it still sheds light on some narrowing aspects of 
corruption laws.178 In Enmons, the Court considered the balance of federalism 
and how Congress deals with the issue when criminalizing actions.  In this 
 
 170 Id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. at 258. 
 174  Id. at 259. 
 175  Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1992). 
 176  Id. at 266. 
 177  Id. at 268. 
 178 410 U.S. 396, 411–12 (1973). 
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case, members of the Gulf States Utilities Company were on strike and were 
seeking new collective bargaining agreements.179  The employees were 
accused of conspiring to obstruct commerce, and through their conspiracy, 
they would commit acts of violence to convince Gulf States Utilities 
Company to comply with their terms.180  In furtherance of their conspiracy, 
five acts of violence were committed—firing rifles at three company 
transformers, draining oil from a transformer, and blowing up a transformer 
substation.181  The government sought charges under the Hobbs Act,182 
claiming that the employees’ actions fell within the scope of the act because 
they used extortion and violence to interrupt interstate commerce.183 
The district court, in hearing the government’s arguments, was 
unconvinced that the Hobbs Act truly extended to the actions of the 
employees.184  When the case made its way to the Supreme Court, it was 
ultimately swayed by the arguments of the district court.185  The Court 
ultimately stated: 
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to 
have significantly changed the federal-state balance.  Congress has 
traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily 
denounced as criminal by the States. . . . [W]e will not be quick to assume 
that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive 
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.186 
This case sheds light on the way the Court considers federalism and 
how that might be a basis for narrowing a vague law.  When faced with a 
statute that is vague and does little to outline what exactly is prohibited, the 
Court might question whether the vague law can disrupt the balance that 
has been stricken between the federal government and the states.  States 
and the federal government can often conflict, and the Court has to deal 
 
 179 Id. at 397. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 398. 
 182 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce 
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts 
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in 
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”). 
 183 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 398–400 (1973). 
 184 United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641, 646 (E.D. La. 1971) (“The union had a right to 
disrupt the business of the employer by lawfully striking for higher wages.  Acts of violence 
occurring during a lawful strike and resulting in damage to persons or property are undoubtedly 
punishable under State law.  To punish persons for such acts of violence was not the purpose of 
the Hobbs Act.”).  
 185 Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411–12. 
 186 Id. at 411–12 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). 
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with that balance.  For example, states and the federal government both 
sue each other, state leaders criticize federal leaders, and vice versa.  For 
these reasons, and the various other conflicts between the federal 
government and the states, the Court narrows corruption statutes so that 
they do not set federal standards for state issues and enable federal officials 
to prosecute state politicians based on these standards. 
These line of cases help to distinguish one of the potential vagueness 
shoals the Court has pulled out in their narrowing of “official act,” that 
broad laws that can be read to criminalize accepted means of governing are 
impermissible.  While a vague law cannot stand if it can be read to 
criminalize political behaviors such as logrolling or scheduling meetings, 
that prohibition does not extend to laws criminalizing what society might 
deem as “bad behavior.”  Federalism plays a role in this calculation, 
because if a state law finds certain behavior permissible but a vague federal 
law could be used to prosecute that behavior, the Court may see that as 
grounds to narrow.  However, in the case of practices like extortion, which 
is not accepted by any state and has long been prosecuted under the 
common law, a vague federal law allowing for the prosecution of this 
behavior would not run into any federalism issues. 
2.  Gratuities  
The facts of Sun-Diamond are detailed above.187  The Court had the 
opportunity in this case to not only address what counts as an “official act,” 
but to also narrow the scope of the gratuities statute.  At trial, the district 
court instructed the jury that the gratuities statute did not require a 
connection between the gift givers intent and a specific official act.188  The 
Supreme Court found this interpretation to conflict with the text of the 
statute, which prohibits gratuities given or received “for or because of any 
official act performed or to be performed.”189  Ultimately, the burden is on 
the government to prove “a link between a thing of value conferred upon a 
public official and a specific official act for or because of which” the thing 
was given.190  
The Court justified their view by looking to the text of the statute and 
determining which reading made the most sense, one that required a 
 
 187  See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
 188  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406 (1999). 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. at 414. 
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connection to a particular act or one that did not.191  The framework of the 
text, along with the belief that Congress could have and would have 
explicitly stated that no connection to a specific act was necessary if that is 
what it intended, led the Court to hold that a gratuity is illegal when it is 
given or received because of a particular official act.192   
Finally, the Court considered the absurd effects a broad law would have 
on the regularly conducted business of public officials.193  Allowing a vague 
law to be used to criminalize gift giving to public officials, with no 
consideration of what in particular the gift was meant to do, would limit the 
involvement of citizens in their government.  A vague law in this space 
could chill public involvement with public officials, and might put in place a 
barrier between citizens and their government leaders.  If citizens are afraid 
to give public officials anything at all for fear of being prosecuted, and 
public officials are afraid to accept anything based on that same fear, then 
this vague law would have successfully undermined some of the protections 
guaranteed under the First Amendment.   
III.  MOVING FORWARD POST-MCDONNELL  AND SUN-DIAMOND 
The sections below provide a concise summary of the vagueness shoals 
in existence and how they might interact together to create a consistent 
doctrine that allows the courts to manage vague laws.  This Part will also 
discuss the recent action in both the Senator Robert Menendez corruption 
case and the Representative William Jefferson case.  It will also address 
vagueness concerns related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and 
consider the vagueness shoals to determine the potential outcomes of any 
future “void-for-vagueness” challenges. 
A.  Charting Vagueness Shoals 
As seen through the narrowing of corruption statutes through the cases 
outlined above, the courts have utilized vagueness shoals as a method to 
trim down overly broad laws.  These impermissible shoals, including catch-
all statutes, infringing on the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, 
undermining federalism, and criminalizing commonly accepted behaviors 
and practices used in efforts to govern could be woven together to paint a 
picture of how a vague corruption law might be curtailed.   
 
 191  Id. at 406. 
 192  Id. 
 193  See supra note 128. 
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A great first inquiry would be whether the law could be used as an 
unchecked catch-all tool to prosecute a wide number of officials.  If the only 
thing preventing the government from engaging in arbitrary enforcement is 
their own discretion, then courts might look to limit a laws application.  Of 
course, prosecutorial discretion is an important part of our criminal justice 
system, so discretion alone will not be enough for a court to find a law too 
vague.  But if that discretion is coupled with a vague term or phrase in a 
statute that allows prosecutors to bring charges against virtually anyone, 
with no forewarning of who might be covered by the statute, then a court 
might look for ways to narrow the law.  To do that, they could turn to the 
other shoals.  
Asking whether the law infringes on the freedoms guaranteed by the 
First Amendment is a good next step in paring down the statute.  When 
considering a statute challenged on vagueness grounds, courts can look to 
see whether the statute could be extended in a way that allows the arbitrary 
prosecution of those with dissenting opinions.  Moreover, if this statute 
could have a chilling effect on participation in the democratic process, the 
Court might narrow the law in a way that prevents potential collisions with 
the First Amendment.  This shoal is particularly relevant in the context of 
public corruption, given the proximity of corruption laws to government 
and politics. 
Once a court has identified a statute’ns use as a potential catch-all and 
has narrowed it to avoid First Amendment shoals, it can consider whether 
there are any federalism issues at play.  Perhaps the best way to approach 
this shoal is to determine whether it is possible for federal standards of 
proper behavior to be applied to state and local officials, in contradiction 
with their own state or local rules dictating what is proper.  If a court finds 
that Congress has not made it explicitly clear that they want to alter the 
federal-state balance on an issue and its prosecutors that are running with a 
vague law to alter that balance, then a court might narrow the law to avoid 
the federalism shoal.  If Congress is explicit in their intention to alter the 
federal-state balance and dictate what is proper behavior of a public official, 
then that statute would not be subject to vagueness shoal narrowing. 
Finally a court would consider whether the corruption law could be 
extended to criminalize behavior or actions that are commonly viewed as 
proper for effective governance.  It is unclear by which standard the court 
will determine whether an action is considered proper for effective 
governance.  In some instances like extortion, where the action has long 
been criminalized, the courts will find that no issue arises.  On the other 
end of the spectrum, vague corruption laws that criminalize activities like 
logrolling and political horse-trading, activities that have long been 
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accepted, will be narrowed to allow the continued use of those activities.  
Courts might rely on what was criminalized under the common law to 
determine if federal criminalization of certain acts is acceptable, even if the 
underlying law is vague?  But where will courts look to determine what is 
“long accepted?”  If this shoal is considered by United States Court of 
Appeals, it could result in various different standards as the circuits look to 
what actions are commonly accepted by the states in their jurisdiction. 
B.  Utility of Charting Vagueness Shoals 
Charting vagueness shoals allows Congress to envision the types of ways 
that their statutes might get interpreted in the courts.  Given the heavy lift 
involved in passing legislation, Congress may prefer to write a law the first 
time around that adequately reflects their intentions and can also withstand 
judicial scrutiny.  A knowledge of vagueness shoals on the front-end could 
lead to Congress getting the law “right” the first time and prevent the need to 
revisit and tweak the law around the edges in response to the Court’s rulings. 
While prosecutors are likely aware of the best practices to argue 
corruption cases, knowing the shoals of vagueness could serve as an added 
benefit.  By identifying these shoals explicitly in communications with 
courts, government lawyers can defend their use of corruption laws that 
may be challenged for vagueness. 
Charting these shoals also allows an opportunity for scholars and 
practitioners alike to review recent actions in corruption cases to determine 
what role, if any, the shoals of vagueness had on a particular court’s 
decisions.  Recent actions that could benefit from a shoals discussion 
include the Senator Menendez corruption case194 and the recent vacating 
of corruption convictions against former Representative Jefferson.195  While 
neither of these cases shed light on vagueness shoals, it is possible to see 
how the shoals are part of the conversation. 
 
 194 United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (D.N.J. 2018); see also Nick Corasaniti & Nate 
Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/nyregion/senator-robert-menendez-
corruption.html?_r=0 (reporting on the Senator Menendez mistrial). 
 195 United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2017); see also Rachel Weiner, Judge Lets 
Former Louisiana Congressman William Jefferson out of Prison, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-lets-former-louisiana-congressman-
william-jefferson-out-of-prison/2017/10/05/8b53619e-aa0b-11e7-850e-
2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.8d06f3e02535 (reporting on legal developments on 
former Representative Jefferson’s corruption convictions). 
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1.  Senator Menendez 
Bob Menendez was the senior Democratic Senator representing the 
state of New Jersey when he, along with his friend Dr. Saloman Melgen, 
were indicted by a grand jury on April 1, 2015 on a number of public 
corruption charges.196  Notably, Menendez was charged with bribery for 
seeking out flights and financial contributions in exchange for “official 
act”197 – a term that was narrowed in McDonnell.198 
In their trial brief, the government detailed lavish trips that Menendez 
took, paid for by his friend Melgen.199  These trips included private jets and 
first class travel to resorts in the Dominican Republic and a high-end hotel 
in Paris, France that cost over $1,500 per night.200  The government argued 
that Menendez did not pay Melgen back for these gifts with money, but 
instead used “official acts” through his position as a United States Senator 
to return the favor.201   
For example, Menendez provided assistance in getting Melgen’s 
girlfriend a visa to the United States after her visa request was initially 
denied.202  Menendez was also accused of pressing the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to drop their demand that Melgen pay $8.9 million in overbillings 
back to the government for payments he improperly received.203  
Menendez’s advocacy on behalf of Melgen’s interests, the government 
argues, was made in exchange for a $600,000 donation made to Majority 
PAC, a Super Pac supporting Democratic Senate candidates, earmarked 
 
 196  United States v. Menendez, 109 F. Supp. 3d. 720, 724–25 (D.N.J. 2015).  The corruption counts 
in the indictment relating to Menendez were as follows: 
(1) Count One charged Menendez with conspiracy to commit bribery and honest 
services wire fraud; 
(2) Counts Three through Eight charged Menendez with bribery for seeking out and 
receiving private flights in exchange for official acts; 
(3) Counts Nine through Eighteen charged Menendez with bribery for seeking out and 
receiving financial contributions in exchange for official acts; and 
(4) Counts Nineteen through Twenty-One charged Menendez with honest services fraud. 
  Id.  
 197  Id. 
 198  See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
 199  United States’ Trial Brief at 3–5, United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d. 606 (D.N.J. 2018) 
(No. 2:15-CR-155). 
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. at 5. 
 202  Id. at 5–6 (alleging that Menendez made calls to government officials to have Melgen’s girlfriend 
re-interviewed by a different interviewing agent). 
 203  Id. at 6–8. 
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for New Jersey.204  
In response to the government’s allegations, Menendez argues that the 
government fails to allege any “official act.”205  According to Menendez, 
the government is relying on a “stream of benefits” theory claiming that 
Menendez received gifts and donations in exchange for future advocacy for 
Melgen’s priorities, if the opportunity arose.206 
After a nine-week trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the 
counts charged in the indictment.207  Menendez moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on the counts.208  The trial court granted the motion in part and 
denied it in part.209  While the government has stated they will not retry 
Menendez,210 vagueness shoals could have played a factor in any 
subsequent appeals following trial. 
 A “stream-of benefits” theory by the government would not likely be 
used to turn the underlying statutes into catch-all tools.  Under this theory, 
money and gifts flow towards the public official with the expectation that 
when the time comes, the public official will take actions to benefit the one 
providing the benefits.  A specific set of circumstances would need to be 
present for the government to bring charges under this theory, thus closing 
the door on its use as a catch-all.  It is also understood that limitations on 
how much citizens can donate to politicians are permissible, so it is unlikely 
that a court would find that a “stream of benefits” theory allows the statute 
to infringe on First Amendment rights.  The theory does not call into 
question issues of federalism or criminalizing commonly accepted efforts to 
govern.  If the “stream of benefits” theory came before an appellate court, 
it is likely that its use would stand. 
2.  Representative Jefferson 
William Jefferson was a nine-term Congressman representing the 
Second Congressional District of Louisiana in the House of Representatives 
 
 204  Id. at 11–13. 
 205  Defendant’s Response to the Government’s Trial Brief at 2, United States v. Menendez, 291 F. 
Supp. 3d. 606 (D.N.J. 2018) (2:15-CR-00155). 
 206  Id. 
 207  Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d. at 611. 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Colin Dwyer, Justice Department Won’t Retry Sen. Menendez After Corruption Case Mistrial, NPR (Jan. 31, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/31/582143169/justice-department-
wont-retry-sen-menendez-after-corruption-case-mistrial. 
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when he was indicted in 2007 on corruption charges.211  The government 
alleged that Jefferson solicited and received payments from various entities 
in exchange for promoting their business interests.212 
The government alleged that Jefferson agreed to promote Vernon 
Jackson’s telecommunications company abroad in exchange for money and 
shares of the company.213  Jackson signed a contract with Jefferson’s family-
owned marketing company and transferred over a total of 550,000 stocks in 
the telecommunications company.214  Jefferson in turn promoted Jackson’s 
company abroad by meeting with high-ranking West African officials, 
negotiating agreements, and arranging meetings with governmental 
agencies.215  In order to ensure the vitality of the agreements he helped 
arrange, Jefferson determined that he needed the support of Nigeria 
Telecommunications Limited (“NITEL”).216  To get this support, he offered 
a bribe to the Nigerian Vice President in exchange for the Vice President’s 
help in persuading NITEL to support Jefferson’s endeavors.217  Jefferson 
received the bribe money from a domestic partner who was working with 
the FBI and agreed that the money she was providing would be used to pay 
the bribe.218  Two days later, the FBI searched Jefferson’s home and found 
the money stashed in his freezer.219 
Jefferson was convicted on eleven counts and appealed his conviction to 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,220 which affirmed his conviction on all 
counts except one.221  Jefferson was sentenced to thirteen years in federal 
 
 211  United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2017).  The corruption counts in 
the indictment were as follows: 
(1) Count One charged Jefferson with conspiracy to solicit bribes, commit honest services 
wire fraud, and violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; 
(2) Count Two charged Jefferson with conspiracy to solicit bribes and commit honest 
services wire fraud; 
(3) Count Three and Four charged Jefferson with solicitation of bribes; 
(4) Counts Five through Ten charged Jefferson with self-dealing and bribery-related 
honest services wire fraud; 
(5) Count Eleven charged Jefferson with foreign corrupt practices; and 
(6) Count Twelve through Fourteen charged Jefferson with money laundering related to 
bribery. 
  Id. at 725–26. 
 212  Id. at 721. 
 213  Id. at 722. 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. at 723. 
 217  United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 723 (E.D. Va. 2017).   
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. at 723–24. 
 220  Id. at 727. 
 221  Id. 
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prison,222 but appealed his convictions following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in McDonnell, arguing that the acts upon he was convicted are no 
longer criminal.223   
The trial court found that in some instances, the jury had sufficient 
evidence and information to base a guilty verdict on despite the erroneous 
definition of official act,224 but in other instances it did not.225  One 
conviction that was upheld was Jefferson’s violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”), which warrants further discussion to decipher what 
role vagueness shoals could have played if the FCPA were challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague. 
C.  Vagueness Concerns of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
While broad criminal statutes are often found to be unconstitutional, 
there are some statutes were vagueness appears to be, for the time being, 
permissible.226  One such statute relating to public corruption is the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. 
The FCPA is a federal law that criminalizes U.S. companies for 
engaging in foreign bribery and mandates certain record keeping 
requirements.227  Regarding bribery, the statute prohibits U.S. companies 
from bribing “foreign officials” to induce them to influence the decisions of 
a “foreign government or instrumentality thereof.”228  Relevant to the 
vagueness discussion is the statute’s prohibition on bribery—particularly 
who counts as a “foreign official” and what constitutes a “government 
instrumentality.”229  The Department of Justice has adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the two terms, allowing for broad enforcement.230  
 
 222  Id. 
 223  United States v. Jefferson, 289 F. Supp. 3d. 717, 721 (E.D. Va. 2017).   
 224  Id. at 741–42. 
 225  Id. at 736–37, 738–39. 
 226 See Boychuk, supra note 2; Godsoe, supra note 2; Kerr, supra note 2. 
 227 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1–3, 78ff (1999). 
 228  Id. § 78dd-2(a)(1). 
 229  See Matthew W. Muma, Note, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2014) (discussing the “vague” and “problematic” 
definitional terms within the FCPA).  The statute itself defines a “foreign official” as follows: 
The term “foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or 
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such 
public international organization. 
  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A). 
 230  Id. at 1340 (citing Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly 
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The FCPA has not seen many vagueness challenges in courts,231 likely 
because of the high level of settlement involved when the government 
brings charges.232  But despite the government’s success in prosecuting,233 
there are still concerns over whether the FCPA is in fact precise enough to 
withstand vagueness challenges.234  The outer boundaries of the statute 
have not solidified, and this fluidity has led to claims that the law in its 
current state leads to too much discretionary enforcement, a claim that has 
roots in the vagueness doctrine.235  Without commenting on the likelihood 
of a future vagueness challenge, it is possible to anticipate how a court 
might view the challenge and whether a narrowing to avoid vagueness 
shoals is necessary.  This is possible by using the vagueness shoal framework 
discussed above.236 
The first inquiry is whether the government is using, or has the 
potential to use, the allegedly vague law as a catch-all tool.  It has been 
alleged that the government has failed to provide sufficient guidance so that 
it can maintain broad enforcement powers without unnecessarily boxing 
itself in.237  An expanded scope for the FCPA can be compared to the once 
 
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 533–34 (2011)). 
 231  See Mike Koehle, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 994 (2010) (discussing 
the development of FCPA law outside the judicial process). 
 232 See Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping 
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 500–01 (2006) 
(describing how the vast majority of FCPA cases are quickly settled). 
 233 See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official 
Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1267 (2008) (“Because of the financial and reputational harm that a 
public FCPA prosecution can cause, nearly all companies targeted by the DOJ and SEC have 
opted for quick settlements of their FCPA disputes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 234 Id. at 1263–64 (describing a potential vagueness challenge to a provision of the FCPA and the 
merits of such a challenge).  Not all courts see this as a vagueness issue, but rather see the FCPA 
as an ambiguous statute that simply must be interpreted.  See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 
746 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the FCPA’s provisions are “amenable to more than one 
reasonable interpretation” and should be subject to the practices governing the interpretation of 
ambiguous statutes). 
 235 See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND 
TRANSACTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 649 (2010) (“The challenge of [an] FCPA practice lies in part 
in the fact that there is little in the way of public precedents on the subject, and the FCPA itself is 
complex and, in many areas, vague.”). 
 236  See supra Section III.A. 
 237  See, e.g., Charles M. Carberry et. al.,DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012), https://www.jonesday.com/ 
DOJ_SEC_Resource_Guide_to_FCPA/ (“Perhaps most important . . . is to understand what the 
document does not say.  Certain questions are . . . left unanswered.  Many of these are matters of 
judgment while others are areas that the DOJ and SEC simply chose to leave vague, giving the 
government the most discretion possible in later . . . actions.”). 
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expanding scope of mail and wire fraud statutes.238  As prosecutors began to 
rely heavily on mail and wire fraud to achieve many of their goals, the 
Supreme Court eventually stepped in and limited the expansion.239  It is 
possible that a court would see the FCPA in a similar light and find that it 
has the potential to be used as a catch-all.  
The next inquiry would ask whether the FCPA infringes on freedoms 
granted by the First Amendment.  Being able to engage in the political 
process is tied in closely with the Freedom of Speech, but being able to 
participate in a foreign country’s political process is not something that 
warrants the same protection by the courts.  A vague law that has the 
potential to chill American participation in a foreign country’s government 
is likely not going to narrowed on First Amendment grounds. 
Federalism issues likely would not play a large role in a court’s 
consideration, especially given that bribery is not something that any state 
government currently endorses.  With the FCPA, the federal government is 
not dictating what is proper in contradiction to state government.  It is 
instead in alignment with state governments in the idea that bribing foreign 
officials is bad for government. 
The FCPA is also not criminalizing commonly accepted actions 
necessary in efforts to govern.  The bribing of foreign officials is likely not 
something that people would consider necessary for governing.  Some 
people might see payments expediting decision-making as generally 
acceptable, but the FCPA allows for “greasing-the-wheel” in some sense by 
not criminalizing payments to move along the process, so long as those 
payments are not influencing the substance of the decision.240   
Given the shoals of vagueness identified, the FCPA likely will not be 
struck down or narrowed on vagueness grounds.  Although the statute may 
be subject to use as a catch-all tool by prosecutors, it does not crash into the 
other shoals that a court might use to conduct the actual narrowing process.  
A vague law that can be used to restrict a company’s ability to send bribes 
to foreign officials does not collide with First Amendment rights or cross 
over into the spectrum of the federal government setting standards on what 
constitutes “good government,” in opposition to the standards of state or 
local governments.  A court is also unlikely to find that the law criminalizes 
commonly accepted actions necessary for effective governing.   
 
 
 238 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 239 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 240  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b). 
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While I do not believe that a court would narrow the FCPA based on 
the shoals I have identified, any subsequent narrowing and the justifications 
behind it will shed light on other vagueness shoals that courts consider. 
CONCLUSION 
The vagueness doctrine serves an important role in criminal law in the 
United States and ensures that individuals receive due process.  Our 
criminal justice system relies on prosecutorial discretion, and this discretion 
itself is not problematic.  But when the discretion is coupled with vague 
statutes that enable arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, there is 
cause for concern.  It is not unreasonable to question why the Court has 
continued to narrow corruption statutes and tweak them around the edges, 
as opposed to simply finding that Congress was too vague in writing the 
laws in the first place.  However, if the Court intends to continue its 
practice of narrowing rather than invalidating, it will be useful to know the 
process it takes in going about its narrowing.  Charting vagueness shoals is 
one way to piece together the Court’s justification in narrowing federal 
corruption statutes. 
 
